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Summary : This paper analyses how income distribution, Intellectual Property Rights and other regulatory
policies such as “minimum quality standards” determine pricing strategies in a dynamic context where a
monopoly periodically introduces new generations or upgrades of a durable good. This paper differs from
Inderst’s (2003) or Koh’s (2006) in that discrimination through quality and screening take place in a setup
where consumers buy several (not a single) versions of the durable good during a lifetime. It differs from
Glass (2001) in that here an equilibrium may emerge in which different consumer types replace their durable
generations with different frequencies. Some of the model’s predictions are shown to be supported by data
from the last Brazilian POF (household budget survey).
Resumo: Este artigo analisa como a distribuição de renda, direitos de propriedade intelectual e outras
políticas regulatórias como “padrões mínimos de qualidade” determinam estratégias de precificação num
contexto  dinâmico em que um monopolista periodicamente introduz novas gerações ou melhorias de um
bem durável. Este trabalho difere dos de Inderst (2003) ou Koh (2006) em que a discriminação através de
qualidade e tempo têm lugar num arcabouço em que os consumidores compram várias (e não apenas uma)
gerações do bem durável ao longo da vida. Ele também difere do trabalho de Glass (2001) pois aqui podem
emergir equilíbrios nos quais diferentes tipos de consumidores trocam de geração de durável com diferentes
freqüências. Algumas das predições do modelo são corroboradas por dados da última POF-IBGE.
Keywords and Phrases: intertemporal price discrimination, durable good monopoly, optimal pricing
strategy, minimum quality standards, imitation
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1. Introduction
In this paper we shall analyse how income distribution, intellectual property rights (IPRs), and other
regulatory policies, such as minimum quality standards, determine pricing strategies in a dynamic context, in
which a single firm (referred to as “the monopolist”) periodically introduces new generations or upgrades of
a durable good.In point of fact, several durable goods are subject to periodic quality improvements, some of
them, like cellular phones or digital cameras, at impressive and ever increasing speeds. When consumers are
simplistically assumed to be homogeneous, a single firm producing the state-of-the-art product may charge a
price sufficiently low so as to eliminate from the market all older generations of the same product
1.
However, when consumers have different income levels or different valuations of quality improvements,
multiple quality levels can sell simultaneously in the market. In this circumstance, time and quality are
different elements that might be used by a monopolist to discriminate between consumers with different
valuations/income levels. Even if the durable good came in a single quality, the monopolist could first charge
a high price and sell the durable to “rich” or high-valuation consumers who have more to loose if they
delayed their purchase.
Of course this depends on the monopolist being able to commit not to change the price of its single quality
product too fast in pursuit of adding up revenue from sales to poor consumers. This is referred to in the
literature as “the commitment problem” or “the firm’s time inconsistency problem” and is examined by
Inderst (2003). In his setup the monopolist makes only one sale of one unit of the durable good to each
consumer, that is, the consumer buys the durable good only once in his lifetime. Time may elapse until the
whole market is cleared (all consumers have acquired the durable good and the game ends). When the
possibility of selling two different qualities at the same time enters the picture, a monopolist without
commitment power will typically clear the whole market immediately, selling a top quality good to high-
valuation consumers and a lower quality one to low-valuation consumers, thus “committing” not to make a
more attractive offer to these latter in the future.
In our setup, quite differently, a monopolist with full commitment ability sells successive generations of the
same durable good to each consumer in his (infinite) lifetime. This dramatically changes the relationship
between quality discrimination and monopoly power: the prospect that the present durable good generation
will be available in the market at a lower price in the future (when poor consumers make their purchases
under discrimination) induces rich consumers to wait or displace their whole consumption program, so that
the monopolist must charge a lower price if he intends to prevent this waiting behaviour from high income
consumers. Thence a trade-off emerges that was not present in Inderst (2003): by not resorting to quality
discrimination the monopolist can charge high prices on rich consumers’ purchases but poor consumers’
waiting time (or “replacement period”) will be longer. A long replacement period, besides meaning a smaller
overall number of purchases in a consumer’s lifetime, also brings along with it a high probability of
imitation, in which event the sale of one of the generations by the monopolist is skipped.
This latter trade-off can be more relaxed the older are the generations the monopolist is free to sell (the price
to rich consumers under quality discrimination approaches the price to rich consumers under simple time
discrimination or “screening”). The limit to how old generations can be put for sale is determined by
                                                          
1 Quality improvement has first been modeled assuming that consumers were homogeneous, new products were perfect substitutes
for old ones, the elasticity of demand was unitary, and per unit cost was constant. As a result of these assumptions, only one quality
level would sell in the market, assuming the leading innovator engage in Bertrand price competition, employing a limit-pricing
strategy. These are now textbook models and one of the ways to generate growth models with endogenous technical progress. See
Grossman and Helpman  (1991).3
competition/imitation or by a regulatory policy setting “minimum quality standards” as examined by Glass
(2001).
Glass’ (2001) setup is one in which the good that is innovated/upgraded is non-durable, and therefore
consumers must buy some quantity every period. Successive generations of this non-durable become
available over time in a quality ladder model fashion, that is, there is a single constant rate of innovation and
successful innovators are able to sell the state-of-the-art generation. With two consumers types (with
different valuations) the oldest generation that may sell in equilibrium is the immediately pre-state-of-arts.
Basically, there are two different kinds of equilibrium, depending on consumers types’ weights in population:
in a “separation equilibrium” (corresponding to quality discrimination), whenever there is an innovation, the
high-valuation consumers switch to the brand-new generation paying a high price and low-valuation
consumers switch to what was until now the state-of-the-art generation paying a lower price. In a “pooling
equilibrium” both consumers’ types pay the same price and only the state-of-arts generation sells. A common
feature of both equilibria is that high and low valuation consumers replace their generations at the same rate,
which is the model’s innovation rate.
In our model, in contrast, income distribution and population parameters may induce equilibria (pricing
strategies) in which both rich and poor consumers replace their generations at the same pace or in which rich
consumers have a higher replacement frequency. Of course, in relation to Glass (2001) we loose one degree
of generality: in our setup the rate of innovation is exogenous, and we normalise time units so that this rate is
one innovation per period.
• • empirical evidences
In countries such as Brazil, in which income inequality is one of the worst in the world, it is easy to observe
quite different qualities of the same product being sold in the market. In point of fact, data from the Brazilian
POF (Household Budget Surveys) reveal that some durables are indeed sold at very different prices.
Considering the purchases made in 2002-2003, the last column of Table 1 below shows that the coefficient of
variation of prices ranges from 0.38 for microcomputers to 0.93 for walkman.  If households are split into
two groups of the same size: the rich households being those with income greater than the medium income
and the poor households being the other half; the figures in parenthesis in the fifth column of Table 1 show
the ratio of the share of rich households to the share of poor ones that bought each durable good in the last
year of the survey. Since all the figures are bigger than one, POF data uncover the stylized fact that poor
consumers tend to have a smaller replacement frequency of durable goods purchases than rich ones. Also, if
we compare those figures in parenthesis with the corresponding figures for price variability (last column) we
find a negative correlation between price variability and rich/poor consumers’ relative replacement
frequency. Assuming that third degree price discrimination
2 is not pervasive, we can hold the view that even
when they renew their durable goods, poor consumers are getting lower quality or less than state-of-the-art
products.
                                                          
2 That is when the monopolist can discriminate between two segments of consumers, charging different prices for the same durable
generation at the same time.4

















263 13 0,084 1,614 (19,21) 0,38
DVD 212 11 0,071 1,297 (18,26) 0,23
Walkman 171 71 0,458 0,645  (1,41) 0,93
Color TV 876 294 1,9 3,757  (1,97) 0,72
CD Player 103 28 0,18 0,484  (2,68) 0,61
Microwave
oven
127 12 0,077 0,742  (9,63) 0,4
Table 1  -  some results from Brazilian POF (Pesquisa de Orçamentos Familiares 2002-2003, IBGE). Durable acquisitions during
one year. For details, see APPENDIX  I
According to reports on the markets for cellular phones of the world leading firm for this product, the
replacement period in Brazil is twice as long as in Europe and fifty percent longer than in the U.S
3. Brazil’s
replacement period is also longer than the average of Latin America where countries like Venezuela and
Colombia have quite short replacement periods
4. Mobile phone companies in Brazil sell on average forty five
models in the domestic market at the same time and the ratio of the highest to the lowest price might be as
large as thirty. Nokia, for example, continues to sell cellular phones with black and white screens to low
income consumers in Brazil along with a top-of-the-line model capable of video recording with high
resolution. This suggests that income inequality together with monopolist-kind discrimination strategies may
play a role in explaining the number of product generations available and consumers’ different average
replacement frequencies for each durable good in various countries.   
• • literature revision :  as usual, there exists a vast related literature. Here we offer only a sketchy map:
− − Multiple (two) qualities; heterogeneous consumers (two). Two competitors instead of a single monopolist:
Gabszewicz&Thisse (1979)
− − Single quality; dynamic analysis; one monopolist: Stokey (1981)
− − Product life cycle and income distribution: Horsky (1990)
− − Multiple qualities; dynamic analysis; one monopolist: Bagnoli, Saland and Swierzbinski (1995); Takeyama
(1997) introduces copying; Inderst (2003)
− − Successive product generations or upgrades; single monopolist: Fudenberg&Tirole (1998); Villas-Boas
(1999).  Fishman&Rob (2000) introduce endogenous growth
− − Successive product generations or upgrades; two competing firms; endogenous growth; quality ladder
model: Glass (2001)
                                                          
3 Bites, Edition 147, 09/29/2005, www.bites.com.br.
4 Valor Online, 09/15/2006.5
− Agents facing a trade-off between buying a new generation of the durable good and keeping the level of
non-durable consumption; durable and non-durable as complementary; intertemporal allocation of income
(non-durable consumption); monopolist practising Intertemporal Price Discrimination: Koh (2006)
• • paper organisation:
In section 2 we describe consumers’ behaviour, showing how reservation prices for durable-goods
acquisitions and frequencies of generation renewals depend on income. In section 3 we present the 2 basic
dynamic pricing strategies: non-discrimination and discrimination. In section 4 we show how the choice
between non-discrimination and discrimination by the monopolist depends on income distribution, minimum
quality standards and IPRs. Section 5 concludes. In the APPENDIX we present some empirical evidence
from the Brazilian POF (household budget survey).
2. Consumers’ behaviour
The infinite time functional is:
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The instantaneous utility is:
                     ( ) ( ) t t t t z p y q u ⋅ − + ⋅ = ln 1 ln                                                                              (2)
in which
1  is the quantity of durable good
qt  is the quality of the durable good available for the consumer at time  t
yt  is the quantity of non-durable good available at time  t  (proxy for income
p  is the the durable’s price measured in units of non-durable
zt = 0  if the consumer doesn’t purchase a new generation of durable at time  t
zt = 1  if the consumer purchases a new generation of durable at time t
If we assume that purchasing the new generation of durable good is not a big burden on the consumer’s
budget (income), then we can tolerably approximate (2) as
5
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Setting q0 = 1,  we assume 
s
t q λ = , where  1 > λ  and  [ ] t s   ...,   2,   ,   1 ∈  is the last period in which the consumer
acquired a new generation of durable, which implies, in particular, 
t
t t q z
  1 λ = ⇒ = .  So the durable good
                                                          
5 If we further assume that what is being purchased is not a new durable good (for example, a new computer), but rather an
updating service on the existing durable (a software, for example), then we can skip modelling a secondary market for old durable
goods. So a  typical consumer will not buy a single unit of the durable good but several updatings during his lifetime.6
does not depreciate physically, providing a perpetual constant flow of services/utility per period, whose level
depends only on the generation it belongs .Let’s assume, for simplicity, that income is invariable over time,
t y yt      ,    ∀ = .
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By (4) we see that, given  p and  y , the consumer  will be willing to buy a new durable generation at time T,
that is,   T T u u    > , when the durable’s generation she/he possesses at time T-1 is very obsolete, that
is,( ) 1 − − T s T  is big. On the other hand, given  p and  ( ) 1 − − T s T  , the consumer  will be willing to buy a new
durable generation at time T when her/his income y is big.
Let’s assume for the moment that “rich” consumers choose replacing their durable’s generation every
period
6, what amounts to an improvement  of λ times in the durable’s quality every period. The condition for
a rich consumer to do so is:
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,in which yr is the rich consumer’s income. Expression (5) gives an upper bound to p assuming rich
consumers change the durable’s generation every period, and is therefore obtained from (4) with  1 1 − = − T sT
.
7
Let us analyse now the “poor” consumer’s problem: inspection of (3) above shows that if it paid-off buying a
new generation at time t = 1, then it would pay-off changing the durable’s generation every period, since the
gain from jumping one generation up is constant and equal to  λ ln = du . So we define the “waiting time” or
“replacement period” of the poor consumer as
                                                          
6 Later, this will be proved to result from an optimal pricing strategy.
7 Our idea of an upper bound to the price charged by the monopolist is essentially the same as in Fishman and Rob (2000): “If old
models in the consumer’s possession continue to be functional after a new model appears, the monopolist can only charge for the
incremental flow of services the new model provides.” (pg. 3)7
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, in which yp is the poor consumer’s income. If time were continuous, or for a small λ, we would have
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In the above equality, the left side is the gain from changing the durable’s generation; the right side is the
cost in terms of the utility of foregone non-durable consumption. Obviously,
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, that is, the poorer the consumer is, the longer it takes for her/him to replace her/his durable’s generation.
And a price reduction leads the poor consumer to increasing her/his replacement frequency.
 From (5) and (6’) comes
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That is, if the price charged on new generations is such that rich consumers replace their generations every
period, then the time poor consumers wait to do so is not greater than the ratio between income levels.
3. Dynamic pricing strategies
3.1 Non-discrimination
Recall we assumed that innovation is a process with memory so that a single firm launches all new
generations in the durable good market. The simplest pricing strategy this monopolist can use is “non-
discrimination”, which here means that one generation of the durable good is sold for a single price over
time and no two different generations are for sale at the same time. It may be the case that poor consumers
buy new generations with a smaller frequency, but whenever they make their purchases they are taking the
same product rich consumers take.
If the single price under “non-discrimination” were just sufficient for the poor to buy the new generation at
every period
                p y p ⋅ = λ ln                                                                                                          ( 8 )
,then by (6’) we would have rp = 1. But this is only one possibility. More generally, consider also
                1     ,    ln ≥ ⋅ ⋅ = γ λ γ p y p                                                                                         ( 9 )8
, then by (6’) we have  γ = p r  for the poor consumer.
 For the rich consumer, two possibilities open up from ( 9 ):





y y p γ λ ln  the rich consumer will still buy a new generation every period.
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p
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y
y y p 1   ,   ln ln , that is, the rich consumer will buy a new
generation less than every period, with rr being the rich consumer’s waiting time, analogous to rp.
However obvious, there can be established the following
3URSRVLWLRQ￿￿￿9￿ii above is never an optimal strategy for the monopolist
3URRI￿￿ ￿ Starting from  r y p ⋅ = λ ln , increasing the price means multiplying it by a factor ρ , but also
multiplying rp and rr  by  ρ, so that if a consumer type  ( ) r p j , ∈  used to buy a new generation 1/rj times
every period when  r y p ⋅ = λ ln , now he/she will buy a new generation  ) ( 1 j r ⋅ ρ  times every period when
1   ,   ln > ⋅ ⋅ = ρ λ ρ r y p . When the price is multiplied by ρ, the frequency is divided by ρ, but since the future is
discounted by a factor β < 1  - see expression (1) above - this amounts to reducing the present value of the
revenues (profits) stream of the monopolist.
So the price under “non discrimination” will be given by ( 9.i ) and the high income consumer will buy a new
generation every period. In order to calculate monopolist’s revenues, we still have to consider population
parameters and the possibility of imitation:
Call  ≡ r n number of rich consumers   and    ≡ p n number of poor consumers
We already know that  γ = p r . Assume also that np is big enough so that poor consumers’ purchases are
uniformly distributed over time. In this case, the expected number of poor consumers changing their
durable’s generation in an one period span of time is   γ p n . Obviously, the number of rich consumers
changing their durable’s generation in an one period span of time is nr.
Now imitation is conceived of as a process by which other firms may become able to produce state-of-the-
art generations with probability i from the very moment those new generations become available in the
market. Imitation is assumed to be a memoryless process  in the sense that expertise is not cumulative, that
is, if I fail to imitate generation t at time t, my probability of imitating generation t at time t + 1 is i, the same
as my probability of imitating generation t + 1 at time t + 1.  If there are many rival imitative firms engaged
in price competition, then the only Nash equilibrium in imitation strategies will be that only the state-of-the-
art generation is targeted by imitators. We also assume that information flows freely and instantaneously
inside the imitators’ community, so that whenever imitation is successful, all imitators become able to9
produce
8. Assuming for simplicity that imitation and production costs are zero, Bertrand competition on the
part of successful imitators will drive the price to zero, causing the monopolist a total loss.
Our innovative monopolist will realise its sales only if imitation fails, what happens with probability (1 – i)
for rich consumers and probability (1 – i)
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Expression (10) reveals a trade-off present in pricing decisions when there is no discrimination: on the one
hand, reducing γ  is the same as reducing the new generation’s price, leading to smaller revenues per period
from sales to rich consumers while leaving sales to poor consumers unaltered
9 ; on the other hand, reducing γ
leads poor consumers to increasing their replacement frequency, 1 / rp , in a context where there is imitation
and the bigger rp  the more likely imitation will occur, thus increasing the expected value of sales revenues
per period. One may regard the other pricing strategy, discrimination, as a means of softening this trade-off.
3.2 Discrimination
Consider a poor consumer willing to buy a new generation at time t. Therefore, it must be  t t u u    ≥  and
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ln ) 1 (   λ ,  that is, given p, yp and  λ , a poor consumer wouldn’t buy a new generation one
period earlier. But at a smaller price he would:
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where pdp denotes the “low” price of a durable α generations old. This price is chosen by the monopolist so
as to make the poor consumer to be willing to switch generations of the durable good every rpd  − δ  periods,
where  rpd  is the time lag for the switching by the poor consumer should she/he face the “high” price pd :




r ⋅ = ⋅
1
ln   λ                                                                                          ( 6’’ )
So the fundamental feature of “dynamic price discrimination” is that the monopolist will induce low income
consumers to buy a product that is already α generations old and to anticipate (δ  periods) their purchases,
                                                          
8 Put another way, imitators don’t run independent projects, and i is already the aggregate probability of imitation.
9 Sales to poor consumers remain constant because if the price is reduced to, say, a half, then the number of poor consumers that in
one period will replace their durables’generation is exactly doubled. This follows from the already known fact that  γ = p r .10
shortening the period in between purchases, while high income consumers will keep buying the state-of-the-
art product at every period. This implies that more than one generation of the (same) durable good are for
sale in the market
10. Typically, poor consumers pay the “low” price pdp for the old generation, and rich
consumers pay the “high” price pd for the new generation.
It is worth noticing that α, the age (number of periods since introduction in the market) of the old generation
product, doesn’t enter expression ( 11 ) above. This is because in a “steady-state” in which poor consumers
always buy durables that are already  α  generations old
11, the only thing they care about is the size of the
quality step they take, that is, (rpd  − δ ) Â￿OQ￿￿￿￿
That indifference towards α is not true, however, for rich consumers − they face the ex ante choice between
buying the durable’s generation t at time t, paying pd for that, or buying generation t at time  t + α  paying
only pdp . When the probability of imitation is properly taken into account, this amounts to comparing
( ) ( )
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Expression ( 12 ) is written as the condition for a rich consumer to be willing to buy generation t at time t,
paying pd for that, rather than buying generation t at time  t + α  paying only pdp. The left side can be viewed
as the expected gain from not waiting and the right side as the expected gain from waiting, although the rich
consumer is in both cases replacing generations every period. For the inequality ≥ above to hold, pd cannot be
too much bigger than pdp ; for although the gain from waiting is time discounted (by a factor 
α β ), waiting
brings about a bigger probability of imitation, in which case the consumer doesn’t pay anything for a new
generation.
12If prices are such that ( 12 ) above holds with equality, that is rich consumers are indifferent
between waiting and not waiting, we can solve it for pdp :




























p                                                          (13)
Now we are ready to solve for the endogenous variables pdp, pd and rpd  − δ : Using (11), (6’’) and (13) comes
                                                          
10 Two generations may be for sale at the same time in Glass’s (2001) model, but not in Inderst’s (2003)  or Koh’s (2006) because
in their setups there exists only one “new generation” and the consumer buys it at most once in a lifetime.
11 “Old” in the sense of being an old model, not in the sense of second hand products.
12 On the right side of expression (12), the factor (1 – i) appears raised to the power α + 1 (plus 1) for the same reason why the
expected cost of not waiting on the left side appears multiplied by  (1 – i ): as before, we assume there existis a probability of
instantaneous imitation, so that if I wait, say, 5 periods to by a generation invented 5 periods ago, there are actually 6 instances in
which imitation can take place.11
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And, by substituting (15) in (11),
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Inspecting (13), we see that as  d dp p p → →   ,   0 α  and thus discrimination disappears. It is worth thinking of .
as a choice variable constrained by what Glass (2001) calls “minimum quality standards”, when the
government forbids sales of too old generations. The limit case is when the government allows only state-of-
the-art generations to be sold in the market, in which case . = 0 and discrimination is impossible. When the
quality standard is some positive integer α  , the choice of α  must befall on {1, 2, ..., α }.In order to
calculate the monopolist’s expected revenue per period under discrimination, an expression analogous to (10)
above, we first notice that a sale for rich consumers will be realised with probability (1– i), and for poor
consumers with probability ( )
δ       1
− −
pd r i .
13  Next, remind that while all nr rich consumers replace their
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Using  (14), (15) and (16) in (17):
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13 Since a successful imitation in any of the  rpd  − δ   periods the poor consumer waits would frustrate a paid generation renewal.12
In expression (18), the monopolist takes as given the parameters and exogenous variables: λ, nr, np, yr, yp, β, i
and α .  If α  = 1, then discrimination can only take place with α  = 1 and the only choice variable is δ, the
number of periods the poor consumer’s generation replacement is anticipated. This choice of δ  is in turn
constrained by:
a lower bound δ  = 0    − − since δ  < 0 would mean that the monopolist charges pdp such that the poor
consumer actually postpones her/his generation replacement relative to what she/he would do under pd, what
in turn would imply pdp  > pd , an absurd by definition of pdp and pd.
an upper bound we find by setting rpd  − δ  = 1 in expression (16) above   − − after all, since we assume that
new generations are launched at a rate 1 per period, the minimum a poor consumer can wait to replace her/his
durable generation is the same as a rich consumer do, that is, 1 period.  This upper bound is given by
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4. Income distribution and pricing strategies
We here address two related questions: 1) Given parameters and exogenous variables’ values, which value of
γ  maximises V, the monopolist’s expected revenue per period under non-discrimination, and which pair of
values ( ) α δ,  maximise Vd, the monopolist’s expected revenue per period under discrimination ?  2) Under
which circumstances is the maximal Vd > maximal V , so that discrimination is a dominant strategy? In
particular, how this depends on population parameters (nr, np), income inequality ( p r y y y ≡ ), Intellectual
Property Rights (IPRs, parameterised by i) and time preferences/interest rates (β )?
It is easier to tackle question 2 first, deriving a sufficient condition for maximal Vd > maximal V. To simplify
the notation, let us adopt the following normalisation:
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and
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Now suppose γ* is the value of  γ  which maximises V’. If, in Vd’, we set,
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then we have
               ( ) 0       1     '       ' > ⋅ − ⋅ = − δ i s V V r d                                                                                   (23)
But when does this condition apply? Substitute, in (22), the lower bound δ = 0, to obtain
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γ                                                                                                (24)
If the maximizer γ* is smaller than the value given by (24), we have maximal Vd’ > maximal V’ with a
positive value for δ. Put another way, more loosely, when V’ is maximised with a small γ value, we can be
sure that discrimination is a better strategy. Inspecting expression (20) we see that this happens when sp, the
share of poor consumers in population, is large and/or when the probability of imitation i is high. The
intuition behind this result should be obvious to the reader.
14
However obvious, this result is already different from what we find in Glass (2001): there she calls a
“pooling equilibrium” a situation where both types of consumers pay the same price for a new (state-of-the-
art) generation, that is, the same as “non-discrimination” here. Well, in our model, except for the trivial cases
when α = 0 or sr = 0, we will never observe a pooling equilibrium with  p y p ⋅ = λ ln , that is, γ = 1 in
expression (9) above; because we know that under these circumstances discrimination would be a better
strategy. On the contrary, in Glass (2001), owing to the classical quality ladder model’s feature that the firms
which produce the state-of-the-art and the pre-state-of-the-art generations are rival (not a single monopolist),
the pooling equilibrium price is always given by the lowest evaluation in the market, that is, the poor
consumer’s evaluation.
In our model, if non-discrimination (pooling) prevails, then γ * is surely bigger than 1.
15  This has another
important consequence: rp, the poor consumers’ replacement period, will always be > 1, since we know that
rp = γ. Thus a stylised fact must be observed under non-discrimination: poor consumers will have a smaller
replacement frequency than rich consumers. With respect to the replacement frequency, how does
discrimination look like?  To answer this, we must go beyond the sufficient condition derived in (22) – (24)
above.
                                                          
14 In PANEL 1 below we plot V´ as a function  of  J for several sets of parameters values.
15 Actually, γ* will always be maximal (equal to y) in those cases, as can be inferred by the shape of V’ schedule, depicted in
PANEL 1 below.14
Taking the first derivative of Vd’ with respect to δ  we get
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, which has an ambiguous sign. While taking the second derivative we get
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So the Vd’  schedule looks like the one plotted in GRAPH 1 below
16:








GRAPH 1 –   Vd’ as a function of  δ
When a function like Vd’ is maximised with respect to δ within an interval
[ ] δ δ    to bound upper     ,       to bound lower   , the result is always a corner solution, that is, either
δ  = 0 ,  or  the upper bound  ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) 1 1 1 1 − − ⋅ + ⋅ − − =
α α α β β δ i y i  . 
17  But substituting δ  = 0 in expressions
(14) and (15), we see that that means pd = pdp, that is, non-discrimination. So the conclusion is: if doing
discrimination pays-off, then this is done with δ  maximal, what in turn implies rpd − δ  = 1, and poor
consumers replace generations every period, like rich consumers do. When the monopolist is allowed to sell
old enough stuff (α  > > 0), then it maximises its profits by making poor consumers replace their generations
                                                          
16 Actually, the graph below is Vd’ plotted for i = 0,1 , β = 0,8 , y = 8 , α = 1,  sr = 0,1.
17 This last value comes from expression (19) above.15
with the greatest frequency possible. On the contrary, if α  is small, so that the upper bound to δ  is small,
then the monopolist will resort to non-discrimination.
18
Also, the upper bound to δ  is decreasing in the time factor β : When β  is small (the interest rate is high) and
the future is much discounted, discrimination is likely the best strategy because the monopolist can open a
big wedge between a high pd and a low pdp without fearing that rich consumers will prefer waiting to buy old
generations of the durable good.
Finally, the way how income inequality (y) affects the monopolist’s strategy choice is a bit more
complicated. Consider the sufficient condition derived above: By (19) the upper bound to δ  is clearly
increasing in y, while by (23) the difference Vd’ − V’ is increasing in δ, so that it might appear that the bigger
is y the more it pays-off to discriminate. However, this reasoning holds only as long as the sufficient
condition applies, that is, when V’ is maximised with a small γ value, which in turn is not true for y too big.
Leaving the sufficient condition aside and performing full maximisation of Vd’ and V’ for a given set of
parameters values, we plot below (GRAPH 2) a typical schedule of the difference DIF ≡ Vd’ − V’ as a
function of y:








GRAPH 2 - the difference DIF ≡ Vd’ − V’ as a function of  y
(for parameters values  sr = 0,1 ; i = 0,2 ; β = 0,9 ; α  = 2)
                                                          
18 The reader will notice that in the text we are implicitly assuming first that the upper bound to δ  is increasing in α, what,
inspecting expression (19) we see it is true for y big enough. Second, and more important, we are assuming the monopolist will
always choose  α α =  (maximal allowed) so as to choose the biggest δ  and thus maximise Vd’ . More formally, what must be
considered in choosing α is  
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dVd  the simple Vd’ schedule plotted above, for a single value of α
( α α = ) , is already a sure guide to find how Vd’ is maximized. More generally, however, what must be considered is an
envelope curve; for some δ values are compatible with more than one α value. For each such δ we must choose the α value which
maximizes Vd’.16
So typically the difference first increases with y (while the optimal non-discrimination price is based on the
poor consumers’evaluation, that is, γ close to 1 ), but eventually it will fall below zero when y gets too big
(so that poor consumers don’t represent a big share of the market income and the optimal non-discrimination
price is based on the rich consumers’evaluation).
This contrasts with Koh’s (2006) striking result that, even when consumers and the monopolist have the same
rate of discount, (intertemporal price) discrimination is always dominant over a constant price (non-
discrimination), while in Stokey (1979) discrimination was always a dominated strategy. Koh’s result is due
to the realistic assumption that consumers face an intertemporal budget constraint, that is, they can borrow or
lend money (non-durable good) over time. So although this is not the main focus of our paper, we are left
with explaining a third possibility, namely, that each strategy (discrimination and non-discrimination) may in
turn be dominant. An exhaustive demonstration is beside the point here, but we may say that this implication
of our model follows from the fact that the monopolist here is constrained by minimum quality standards
(recall α  above), so that it is not entirely free to choose how old are the generations it sells to poor
consumers.
5. Conclusions
Recollecting the results we got, we may say that discrimination is likely to occur when income distribution is
bad (high sp and high y) but poor consumers still represent a not negligible share of the economy’s income (y
cannot be too high); when IPRs are low (high probability of imitation i); and when the future is very much
discounted (low β , what can be interpreted as a high interest rate). Another necessary condition for
discrimination is that quality standards are absent or not too strict − more generally, we may say that
discrimination is likely to be observed in markets where old generations/models sell at the same time that
state-of-the-art ones. The pricing strategies (discrimination and non-discrimination) influence the poor
consumers’ replacement frequency in different ways: under discrimination, poor consumers will have the
same replacement frequency as rich consumers, while under non-discrimination generally poor consumers
are expected to take much more time to replace their durable good’s generation.
To finish, there are two remarks we would like to make:
The first has to do with the impact of income distribution on welfare in our model. To illustrate this point,
consider 3 “poor” consumers with identical incomes (as measured in terms of our model’s nondurable good),
but each living in a different economy, the economies being isolated from one another and each served by a
monopolist like the one in our model: the first consumer lives in a place where almost everybody is poor and
income inequality is low; the second guy lives in a place where the share of poor consumers is big and
income inequality is high; the third lives in a place where the share of poor consumers is small and inequality
is big. Then our model predicts that the first guy is better off than the second guy, who is better off than the
third guy: the first guy may very well be replacing his durable’s generation with a high frequency paying a
low price; the second guy will pay a higher price but still enjoy a high replacement frequency; the third guy
will pay an even higher price while having a low frequency. 
19
The second remark has to do with the conclusion we reached that discrimination is more likely to be the
underlying phenomenon in markets where old generations/models sell at the same time that state-of-the-art
ones. Maybe this helps explaining the fact observed in Brazilian POF (Household Budget Survey, see
                                                          
19  By a “poor” consumer we should understand someone who is nevertheless able to buy the durable good, so the above
illustration does not apply to immiserized populations.17
APPENDIX) that while rich consumers replace their computer models with much greater frequency than
poorer consumers, both rich and poor consumers seem to be replacing their Walkmans or colour TVs with
the same frequency. Indeed, when we inspect what is for sale at those different markets, we see that
practically only latest generations of computers are fabricated, while many different vintages/models of
Walkmans or TVs are being currently fabricated. Recall that in our model discrimination involves
simultaneous fabrication/sales of different generations and that under discrimination both poor and rich
consumers are expected to be replacing their generations with the same (maximal) frequency. Prices charged
on the same good are expected to differ considerably, what seems to be the case for Walkmans and Colour
TVs when we take the price mean deviation divided by the mean price in spot markets. Under non-
discrimination, on the contrary, only state-of-the-art durables sell, and poor consumers will be replacing their
generations at a smaller pace. There is a single price charged on each good, what grossly seems to be the case
for computers and DVDs, which have a much smaller spot price variance.
_______________________________________________________________________________________
PANEL  1  -  V´ as a function  of  J for several sets of parameters values
 sr = 0,1 ; i = 0,05 ; y ≤ 5                                        sr = 0,1 ; i = 0,2  ; y ≤ 20







               







 sr = 0,05 ; i = 0,2 ; y ≤ 20                                     sr = 0,01 ; i = 0,05 ; y ≤ 100
















APPENDIX   − −  SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCES FROM BRAZILIAN POF
I  -  price variability and replacement frequency
Total number of households interviewed = 30979  ⇒ medium household = 15490
Income of the medium household (per year) = R$ 1063
Thus we split the universe of households in 2: “rich” households are those whose income > R$ 1063, and
“poor” households are those whose income < R$1063
From POF’s table 15 (purchases in the last one year, 2002-2003) we extracted the following data:











Micro Computer 1051 66 0,4261 6,35
DVD 625 47 0,3 3,73
Walkman 269 119 0,768 0,968
Color TV 5560 3058 19,74 16,15
CD Player 412 184 1,18 1,47
Microwave oven 450 81 0,523 2,38
Next we control for the primary market, eliminating second-hand purchases:











Micro Computer 838 44 0,284 5,126
DVD 612 41 0,2647 3,686
Walkman 238 97 0,626 0,91
Color TV 3915 1820 11,75 13,52
CD Player 328 129 0,833 1,285
Microwave oven 392 57 0,368 2,163
Finally we control for the spot market, eliminating purchases on credit:

















263 13 0,084 1,614 (19,21) 0,38
DVD 212 11 0,071 1,297 (18,26) 0,23
Walkman 171 71 0,458 0,645  (1,41) 0,9319
Color TV 876 294 1,9 3,757  (1,97) 0,72
CD Player 103 28 0,18 0,484  (2,68) 0,61
Microwave
oven
127 12 0,077 0,742  (9,63) 0,4
In parenthesis is the number of times “% of rich households are buyers”  is of  “% of poor households are
buyers”
The figures inside parenthesis in the fifth column are equal to the figures not in parenthesis in fifth column
divided by the figures in the fourth column; they give, thus, relative replacement frequencies of the type “rich
consumers’ replacement frequency / poor consumers’ replacement frequency for durable good i”. Comparing
these relative frequencies to the price variability indexes in the sixth column, we find that when price
variability is low (indicating “non-discrimination”, in our model), poor consumers have a much lower
replacement rate than rich consumers, as is the case for the durable DVD. The converse is true for durables
like Colour TV and Walkman.
II  -  price variability and income inequality
The second piece of evidence we can extract from POF relates price variability  and income inequality at
Brazilian States (called UF) level. We use here the same indexes as before: price variability = price mean
deviation / mean price  and  income inequality = mean income of the 50% richest / mean income of the 50%
poorest in the population. See for example what we find for the durable good Color TV, by far the most





























Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C(1) -0.139894 0.238363 -0.586893 0.5625
C(2) 0.187350 0.044613 4.199479 0.000320
R-squared 0.413636     Mean dependent var 0.850059
Adjusted R-squared 0.390181     S.D. dependent var 0.234994
S.E. of regression 0.183509     Akaike info criterion -0.481919
Sum squared resid 0.841889     Schwarz criterion -0.385931
Log likelihood 8.505908     Durbin-Watson stat 2.038014
Inspecting the plotting and the regression results we find a positive correlation between income and price
variability at Brazilian States (UFs) level.
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